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OPTION TO PURCHASE-ASSIGNMENT
It is generally agreed that, absent a manifestly contrary intention of the
parties, upon a valid assignment of a lease containing an option to pur-
chase, the option, as a covenant running with the land, passes to the as-
signee and may be enforced by him in the same manner and to the same
extent as by the original lessee.32 But where the option clause provides for
the extension of credit to the optionee for at least a portion of the pur-
chase price, upon acceptance of the option, the option contemplates a rela-
tion of personal confidence between the lessor and the lessee and it is
therefore not assignable. 33 However, in Rosello v. Hayden,34 a lease con-
tained an option to purchase partly on credit and the court held that the
assignee of the lease could enforce the option upon offering to pay cash in
full.
CONCLUSION
It can be seen that in dealing with option clauses contained in real estate
leases, the courts apply rules of law only after considering (1) the lan-
guage of the option clause, (2) the lease in its entirety, (3) the intention
of the parties and (4) the extrinsic circumstances in each case.
Many of the problems which arise would be avoided or more easily
solved by more careful draftsmanship in order to manifest the intent of
the parties.
8 2 In re Frayser's Estate, 401 Ill. 364, 82 N.E. 2d 633 (1948); Keogh v. Peck, 316 Il1.
318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925).
38 Kritz v. Moon, 88 Ind. App. 5, 163 N.E. 112 (1928); Prichard v. Kimball, 190 Cal.
757, 214 Pac. 863 (1923); Menger v. Ward, 87 Tex. 622, 30 S.W. 853 (1895).
34 79 So. 2d 682 (Fla., 1955).
CHARITIES-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN ILLINOIS, 1942-1957
Increasing interest has been focused on the law of charitable trusts. Per-
haps the most notable development has been in the field of tort immunity.'
In view of the immense public value of charities, problems such as "what
qualifies as a charity ' 2 and "how can charities be saved from invalidity"
are of great significance. Of course tax considerations which pervade all
fields of law are also a problem in charitable trusts. The following discus-
sion does not attempt to develop any particular aspect of charities but
rather to review the Illinois cases from 1942 to 1957.
' Charitable Institutions-Immunity from Tort Liability, 4 De Paul L. Rev. 56 (1954).
2 Professor Curran has discussed the question of whether a trust for masses qualifies
as a valid charity. Curran, Trust for Masses, 7 Notre Dame Lawyer 42 (1931); and
Curran, Charitable Trusts for Masses 1931-1956, 5 De Paul L. Rev. 246 (1956).
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QUALIFYING AS A CHARITY
In Illinois the definition of a "charity" invariably referred to is the one
found in Crerar v. Williams:
A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of per-
sons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion,
by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them
to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or
works, or otherwise lessening the burthens of government. It is immaterial
whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described to
show that it is charitable in its nature.5
The limited litigation on this point has been concerned with cemeteries.
In each of two cases handed down by the Supreme Court, cemeteries were
held to be valid objects for charitable trusts. In Stubblefield v. Peoples
Bank of Bloomington4 the court was concerned with the problem of a
private cemetery corporation which was almost a mixed trust, i.e. chari-
table and profitable. The cemetery corporation had in the past provided
for dividends but had never declared them and had subsequently (but be-
fore this suit) stricken the dividend provisions from its bylaws. The court
in examining the facts, found enough of the charitable element to establish
a valid charity. In dicta, the court said that if the trust would fail because
of the profit element, equity would separate the private from the charita-
ble element in order to save the charity.
The requirement of an indefinite number of persons was the subject
matter of an appellate court holding.5 The devise in that case was for
hospitalization and medical supplies for "worthy persons" residing in the
city of Geneseo (population 4,325). It was held that the class was large
enough so that the community had an interest in the performance of the
trust. The court used as a definition the one appearing in the Crerar case
indicating a liberal construction so as to save the gift.
On the other hand, when construing a tax exemption statute the courts
are as strict as they are liberal in saving charities. To qualify for exemption
under the Revenue Act of 19396 (property tax) or under the provisions
for inheritance taxes, 7 the property sought to be exempted must be used
for a charitable purpose. It is not enough to show that the organization
holding the property has done some charitable work. "A charitable pur-
pose must refer to some specific form of conduct or course of actions
3 145 Ill. 625, 643, 34 N.E. 467, 470 (1893).
4 406 Ill. 374, 94 N.E. 2d 127 (1950).
5 Raser v. Johnson, 9 Ill. App. 2d 375, 132 N.E. 2d 819 (1956).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 120, S 500.
7 I. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 120, S 401
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tending to promote the well-doing and well-being of social men."8 In the
case of In re Estate of Schureman9 an exemption was denied to a Masonic
organization because of the secret nature of its purpose. The court as a
matter of judicial notice held that the Masons were not a charity because
of the secrecy of their purpose. Moreover, the court recognized the fact
that the devise did not specify a charitable use but was given uncondi-
tionally to the Masons. The case suggests the possibility that a devise to a
Masonic organization if restricted to a legally recognized charitable use
would be exempt.
There is a distinction to be made in the case of property tax exemptions
which concerns itself with the use of the land sought to be exempted. On
the same day that the Supreme Court decided the Schureman case, it
handed down two other decisions dealing with charitable use. In Rogers
Park Post No. 28 v. Brenza' ° the court set up two requirements for a
charitable exemption: (1) ownership by a charitable organization and
(2) exclusive use for charitable purposes. An exemption was refused to
the American Legion Post because, although it was a nonprofit organiza-
tion, it had no charitable functions. The building in which the post was
located was used for bingo games, dances and meetings, none of which
qualified as a charitable use.
Upon the same grounds, a tax exemption was denied to the International
College of Surgeons for their headquarters building in Chicago. The
organization is wholly supported by the dues of its members. Its purposes
are to aid in creating higher standards of surgery through the association
of leading surgeons, to promote the education of its members, to combat
unethical and illegal practices and to inspire younger members to become
more skilled in the art of surgery. There was also evidence that the college
did various acts of charity. The court in denying the exemption said:
The mere fact that property is held by an institution of public charity, it is
seen, is not sufficient to exempt it from taxation. The property itself must be
devoted to charitable purposes, and it must be in actual use by the institution in
carrying out directly its charitable purposes.... In determining what is meant
by charitable purposes in the statutory sense [tax exemption statute] the fact
that the activities of the organization are not conducted for profit is not of con-
trolling importance."
The preceding rule of "exclusive use for charitable purpose" might not,
however, be as rigid as the above indicates. In an earlier Supreme court
8 In re Estate of Schureman, 8 111. 2d 125, 131, 133 N.E. 2d 7, 10 (1956).
9 8 Ill. 2d 125, 133 N.E. 2d 7 (1956).
10 8 Ill. 2d 286, 134 N.E. 2d 292 (1956).
11 International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, 8 111. 2d 141, 144, 133 N.E. 2d 269, 271
(1956).
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case, People v. Missionaries,12 appellant objected to taxes levied on dormi-
tories of a religious educational institution assessed because they were used
during the summer months for housing guests. In holding that an exemp-
tion was proper the court said:
When the primary purpose to which the property is applied is for a public
educational, charitable, religious or other exempt purpose, income obtained from
a secondary or incidental use for nonexempt purposes will not, of itself, render
the property nonexempt.' 3
CHARITABLE INTENT-THE MAGIC WORDS
A fundamental and established rule of law in this State is that bequests and
devises for charitable purposes are looked upon with favor and all reasonable
interpretations and inferences tending to uphold them are made by the courts.14
This familiar phrase appears in cases where some difficulty arises in vali-
dating a charitable trust. Although the "intent" is often not the sole
criterion,' 5 it would be helpful to observe particular difficulties in recent
cases that were overcome by finding a charitable intent.
In Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. University of
Notre Dame,16 the testator devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate
to the lay trustees of the university in trust for worthy students intending
to study for the priesthood. The university never had a board of lay
trustees and at the death of the testator (1942) the corporate existence of
the school had been dissolved by court order (1937) because of its failure
to file reports and otherwise conform with the Illinois corporation laws.
In 1944 the school petitioned to have the dissolution order set aside be-
cause of improper service. The equity court revived the corporate exist-
ence of the university. On appeal the Supreme court in examining this
sequence of events, i.e. dissolution, charitable bequest and revival of the
corporation, along with the fact that there was never a board of lay
trustees, held the trust valid. The court remarked:
[A] court of equity may revive or resuscitate a dead corporation. It is a well
established rule in this state that a court of equity will not allow a charitable
trust to fail for want of a trustee ... nor will it be allowed to fail for uncertainty
or because the manner specified for managing the gift cannot be carried into
exact execution.' 7
12409 I11. 370, 99 N.E. 2d 186 (1951). 13 Ibid., at 375 and 189.
14 Caruthers v. Fisk University, 394 I11. 151, 159, 68 N.E. 2d 296, 300 (1946).
15 In Rubel v. Friend, 344 Ii. App. 450, 101 N.E. 2d 445 (1951), the trust was sought
to be invalidated because the instructions to the trustee provided for application of the
funds ten years after the testator's death. The appellate court thought that the inherent
power of equity was needed to save the trust because of the fact that there was no pro-
vision for nonexecution by the trustees.
16 326 I11. App. 567, 63 N.E. 2d 127 (1945).
17 Ibid., at 575 and 131.
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In Caruthers v. Fisk University,' a 1946 case, a charitable devise to Fisk
University was clouded by the occurrence of a condition subsequent. The
devise was subject to the condition that the testatrix's niece be educated at
the expense of the institution. The university communicated with the
niece several times expressing its willingness to abide by the terms of the
devise and urged her to enroll. The niece, however, of her own volition
attended another school. In dismissing the niece's appeal the Supreme
court held that all conditions laid down by the testatrix had been fulfilled.
The expressed charitable intent of the testatrix along with the fact that the
niece who stood to gain by the failure of the trust by her own choice did
not attend, were the motivating forces for the holding.19
The power of the court of equity to strike superfluous words from a
will was reinforced by the charitable character of the bequest in Mason v.
Willis. 20 The court struck the phrase "of America" from a bequest to the
Salvation Army of America in order to conform with the registered title,
"Salvation Army." It also allowed extrinsic evidence to show that the Illi-
nois Salvation Army was the intended object among four other organiza-
tions of the same name.
Gifts in perpetuity to a charity are invariably attacked as a violation of
the rule against perpetuities. A lucid analysis of the law on this subject
appears in Walliser v. Northern Trust Co. of Chicago,21 a 1949 case:
It has been repeatedly held, that the rule against perpetuities pertains to the
vesting of interests and not to their duration.... [A]nd if there is no perpetuity
in the first taker, and the gift to the charity vests immediately upon the expira-
tion of the lives in being, the rule cannot be interposed to invalidate the charita-
ble trust even though it may continue indefinitely. Nor is it necessary that the
corpus ever be paid to the charity.
Equity adopted a construction which avoided the application of the
rule against perpetuities in Monarski v. Greb.22 In that case the testator
devised to his collaterals and if they were disqualified because of their
alien status, then two years after the end of the war23 it was to go to the
church, if the collaterals were still disqualified. Since the war could endure
indefinitely, invalidity because of the rule seemed inevitable. The Attorney
General intervened, claiming succession to the interest of the aliens. After
Is 394 1. 151, 68 N.E. 2d 296 (1946).
19 The decision deals at greater length with the ability of the university to hold title
to the property.
20 326 Il. App. 481, 62 N.E. 2d 135 (1945).
21 338 Ill. App. 263, 273, 87 N.E. 2d 129, 133 (1949). Accord: Catholic Bishop of
Chicago v. Murr, 3 111. 2d 107, 120 N.E. 2d 4 (1954).
22 407 Ill. 281, 95 N.E. 2d 433 (1950).
23 The testator used "armistice" but the equity court construed it to mean the end of
the war.
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discussing the fact that the testator was a priest himself and that his inten-
tion was to benefit the church rather than the Attorney General, the court
construed the will so as to have the gift vest in the church immediately
upon disqualification of the collaterals and, therefore, avoided the applica-
tion of the rule.
CY PRES
It is difficult to perceive where the motivating force of the inherent
power of equity to save trusts ends and the doctrine of cy pres begins.
The appellate court was faced with this precise problem in First National
Bank of Chicago v. King Edwards Hospital Fund.24 The testator be-
queathed funds in trust to the King Edwards Hospital. The nationalization
of the hospitals by the National Health Act of Parliament made it neces-
sary to invoke the extraordinary powers of equity. Appellants urged that
the gift failed because the testator's specific purpose was to benefit a
voluntary hospital which had been extinguished. The chancellor relied on
cy pres, but the court in affirming said:
The chancellor, in finding for the hospitals, places his principal reliance on
the cy pres doctrine. We are of the opinion that the relief afforded in the in-
stant case could have been obtained by the exercises of the court's inherent
equity powers.... The award of these funds to those hospitals under the present
management and ownership is not just an application of these funds to institu-
tions of a similar charitable purpose, but to the identical purpose contemplated
by the testator.25
As appears in a 1946 Illinois case, there are certain prerequisites for in-
voking cy pres:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impractical or illegal to carry out the particu-
lar purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the
property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct
the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within
the general charitable intention of the settlor. This doctrine, however, does not
apply if the settlor provides for the application of the funds in the event of the
failure of the purpose first intended. 26
Cy pres was held inapplicable in Continental National Bank and Trust
of Chicago v. Sever.27 There the testator left the residue of his estate for
the establishment of an educational institution in Missouri or if impracti-
cal, to an institution already in existence, with the designation that it be
241 I1. App. 2d 338, 117 N.E. 2d 656 (1954).
25 Ibid., at 362, 363 and 667.
26 First National Bank of Chicago v. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions, 328 Ill. App. 481, 485, 66 N.E. 2d 446, 448 (1946).
27 393 Il. 81,65 N.E. 2d 385 (1946).
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left to "my trustees." The testator's first intention was to have a separate
institution established but he provided alternatively for a gift to one al-
ready in existence. The lower court appointed a commission to select an
appropriate institution in an attempt to exercise cy pres. The commission
designated St. Louis University but the trustees pursuant to authorization
in the will, selected Washington University. The lower court decreed the
fund go to St. Louis University in accordance with the commission's
report. The appellate court reversed and the Supreme court in affirming
the appellate court said in part:
Courts of equity will not, however, interfere with the exercise of the discre-
tionary powers of a trustee .. . nor will they undertake to exercise a discretion,
which by the instrument creating the trust, has been left to the trustee. 28
Here the court indicated that although the testator's first intention, estab-
lishment of an institution, was impractical, there appeared an alternative,
thus making the application of cy pres improper.
The appellant's contention in the Continental National Bank & Trust of
Chicago case, the application of cy pres, represents a paradoxical conflict
between the doctrine of cy pres and equity's concern with following the
general charitable intent of a testator because the former has its logical
basis in the latter. The conflict also appears in First National Bank of Chi-
cago v. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.2 There
the testatrix established a benevolent fund from which nineteen charities
were to receive income to be appropriated in specific amounts, first to the
Union Congregational Church and then successively to eighteen other
charities. The church was destroyed by fire and it was urged that cy pres
be applied to save the bequest. The court held that cy pres did not apply
since the settlor provided for application of the fund in the event of the
failure of the purpose first intended. The more general charitable intent
could best be effected not by applying cy pres but by following the actual
intention of the settlor.
In Martin Home for Old Folks v. Unknown Owners,30 the court con-
sidered whether a charitable trust which could possibly not sustain itself
was the proper subject of cy pres. The trustees of the home contracted
with a hospital. The hospital was to take over the funds and apply them
to care for the aged within the hospital. The court held that it was neces-
sary for the devise to be impossible or impractical and would not apply
cy pres where there appeared only a possibility that the trust might not
sustain itself financially.
Refusal by two alternative trustees to accept a trusteeship has been held
28 Ibid., at 93 and 391.
29 328 Ill. App. 481, 66 N.E. 2d 446 (1946).
30 4 Ill. App. 2d 145, 123 N.E. 2d 861 (1955).
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to be a proper reason for the application of cy pres. In a 1950 case, 3 1 both
of two religious orders alternatively designated as trustee for the establish-
ment of an orphans' home declined to accept the trust. The court found
that there was a general intent to benefit orphans rather than the particular
religious orders. In order to effectuate the gift, a trustee was substituted.
The same reasoning was used in Community Unit School Dist. No. 4 v.
Booth3 2 where a devise to School District 13 was impossible because it
has been abolished and its area incorporated by district 4. The Supreme
court approved the lower court's application of cy pres in that the inten-
tion was to benefit the school community rather than a district named
"13."
The Illinois Supreme Court in 1954 and 1956 considered the sale of land
held in trust when the land becomes useless to the charity. In Catholic
Bishop of Chicago v. Murr,33 land was conveyed to the Bishop for ceme-
tery use with a restraint on alienation. The court first held that "a condi-
tion in a deed which wholly forbids alienation as does the contention in
this conveyance is invalid unless the deed creates a charity." 34 After hold-
ing the restraint valid the court suggested that by virtue of cy pres, it
could be alienated:
We hold, therefore, that this gift in trust, to be used for cemetery purposes is
a charitable trust, and that an absolute restraint upon alienation of that land is
therefore not invalid.
It does not follow, however, that a court of equity, in the exercise of its tra-
ditional power over charitable trusts may not decree that the land or some part
of it, may be sold. 35
The case was remanded in order to find whether or not the then present
conditions justified the sale of the property. On remand the Circuit Court
of Will County found the tract unsuitable for burial purposes and that
circumstances fully justified its sale. The appellate court affirmed the cir-
cuit court but did not base its holding on cy pres.36
By the same reasoning, the Supreme court in 1956 applied cy pres in
authorizing the City of Aurora to sell land devised to it for public use.37
It held that the statute under which the land was sought to be conveyed
was inapplicable but remanded, suggesting that if holding the land by the
city was unfeasible, then by cy pres the money derived from a sale thereof
could be put to public use.
31 First National Bank of Chicago v. Liott, 406 Ill. 44, 92 N.E. 2d 66 (1950).
32 1 Ill. 2d 545, 116 N.E. 2d 161 (1953).
33 3 111. 2d 107, 120 N.E. 2d 4 (1954).
34 Ibid., at 109 and 7. 35 Ibid.
36 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Castle, 14 111. App. 2d 495, 144 N.E. 2d 874 (1957).
37 City of Aurora v. Y.M.C.A., 9 Ill. 2d 286, 137 N.E. 2d 347 (1956).
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TORT LIABILITY
The cases on immunity from tort liability must be discussed with
chronological reference to Moore v. Moyle.38 Cases before the Moore de-
cision gave immunity for various considerations.39 The Moore case repre-
sents the modern trend away from charitable immunity.40 It held that a
judgment against a charitable institution was valid but could not be satis-
fied by trust funds. Therefore, charitable institutions are liable to the ex-
tent that they have liability insurance.41
CONCLUSION
It appears that the most notable development in the law of charitable
trusts is in the field of tort liability. The distinction between cy pres and
equity's inherent powers poses the problem of which to apply. Some
courts have been reluctant to apply cy pres while others apply it very
liberally, arriving at the same result but leaving doubt as to the propriety
of its application. Strict conformance with the tax exemption statutes set
requirements of (1) ownership by a charitable organization and (2) ex-
clusive use for charitable purposes. The public benefit attributed to chari-
table trusts makes the law pertaining thereto a matter of increasing con-
cern.
38 405 111. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
39 Meyers v. Y.M.C.A. 316 Ill. App. 177,44 N.E. 2d 755 (1942). In Lenahen v. Ancilla
Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N.E. 2d 445 (1947), immunity was based on consider-
ations of public policy and on the theory that respondeat superior did not apply.
40See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1957), noted in 7 DePaul L.
Rev. 131 (1957) infra.
41 Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Ill., 1954) which held that the existence of
trust funds need not be alleged in a complaint. The district court reiterated the fact that
immunity such as it exists is not immunity to liability, but rather to execution of the
judgment on trust funds; Slenker v. Gordon, 344 Ill. App. 1, 100 N.E. 2d 354 (1951);
W'endt v. Servite Fatherl, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947).
REDISTRICTING WARDS
"Ward" is of teutonic origin and has a variety of meanings all of which
spring from the general idea of a military guard or protector. Thus, a per-
son elected from such section is considered a protector of a geographical
part as distinguished from the city as a whole.'
Wards do not possess any power of local self-government, and are
erected exclusively for the purpose of securing representation in the city
government. The method of determining the number and the manner of
1 Hammond v. Young, 117 N.E. 2d 227, 231 (1953).
